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Abstract—The proliferation of cloud computing highlights the
importance of techniques that permit both secure storage of
sensitive data and flexible data management at the same time.
One line of research with this double motivation is the study
of Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) that has provided
several outstanding results in the recent years. These solutions
achieve sublinear keyword search in huge databases by using
various data structures to store keywords and document iden-
tifiers. In this work, we focus on certain scenarios in which
search over the whole database is not necessary and show that
the otherwise inefficient sequential scan (in linear time) can be
very practical. This is due to the fact that adding new entries
to the database comes for free in this case while updating a
complex data structure without information leakage is rather
complicated. To demonstrate the practicality of our approach
we build a simple SSE scheme based on bilinear pairings and
prove its security against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks in
the standard model under the widely used Symmetric eXternal
Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption.
Index Terms—Searchable Symmetric Encryption, Forward
Index, Type-3 Pairings, MAC.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPUTATION on hidden data and especially Search-able Symmetric Encryption (SSE) has become an exten-
sively studied area of cryptography in the last more than one
and a half decade, since the appearance of the seminal paper of
[17]. The concept of SSE allows the secure storage of sensitive
data on untrusted servers in the cloud without losing all the
flexibility that plaintext data would allow. More precisely it
supports keyword search over the ciphertexts in the following
way: encrypted queries called trapdoors can be sent to the
server which can test whether any of the stored ciphertexts
matches the keyword underlying the trapdoor.
The two natural approaches towards realizing SSE are called
“forward” and “inverted index”. The first one is to attach (or
even include) one-way mappings of searchable keywords to
the encrypted data. This leads to linear search complexity in
the number of documents as the server has to go through all
of them with a sequential scan to find all the matches for a
trapdoor. A more sophisticated arrangement of the ciphertexts
is to build an “inverted index”. In this case, the documents
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(or their IDs) are sorted based on the one-way mappings of
keywords which are related to them. The latter solution allows
logarithmic search complexity in the number of keywords.
This clear benefit caused that the inverted index approach be-
came prevalent in SSE design which made significant progress
in the past years [19]. At the same time these solutions are
rather complex and while operating smoothly on huge static
databases (DB), handling the rapid expansion of the DB turns
out to be more troublesome as the underlying data structure
has to be updated without information leakage (see Table I for
details).
In this work, we are looking for a simple solution to
specific problems in the domain of SSE for which the inverted
index based approach is not practical. Imagine the following
scenarios!
Scenario 1. A device, deployed in an untrusted environment
stores its own event logs in an SSE encrypted form
with the event type as a keyword and possibly with a
public time-stamp. It is often plausible to assume that
the different events occur relatively often, resulting in
frequent updates, and a remote operator is more likely
to search for a specific event in a given time frame than
in the entire DB. He can send a trapdoor together with a
tract of time to the device that checks its encrypted DB
and replies with the positive test results.
Scenario 2. The onboard unit of a vehicle regularly sends
encrypted aggregate data to an honest but curious remote
server. The data packets are tagged with a few predefined
characteristic features of the given packet e.g., the oil
level was under the limit, speeding was detected, the
seatbelt was not fastened etc. An authority, possibly
maintained by the car manufacturer as part of their
services, can issue trapdoors for the car service/insurance
company/police who can send these to the server and
check whether some hypothetical event has occurred in
a time period of interest. This process speeds up the
actions as it can happen even in the absence of the vehicle
and preserves the privacy of the car owner as no data,
unrelated to an event, has to be decrypted as the relevance
of some hidden data can be tested using SSE.
The first common characteristic feature of these use cases
is that finding all the occurrences of a given keyword in the
whole DB is not the goal. Particularly they highlight that
finding some correspondence in a properly chosen part of
the DB can also be meaningful. Secondly, new entries are
frequently added to the DB and therefore rapid updates are
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crucial, hitting the Achilles heel of the widespread inverted
index approach.
A. Related Works
Several aspects of searchable encryption have been studied
in the past years. We mention only a few of them and refer
to recent surveys [4], [19] for an extensive summary on SSE.
[7] captured first formally the intuitive goal of minimizing
information leakage during keyword search (see section III-B).
Schemes were put forward that allow not only single but also
conjunctive/disjunctive keyword search [5]. Ranked keyword
search over encrypted data was proposed by [20], [21]. Dy-
namic SSE schemes were designed to handle large DBs with
possible updates (see details in subsection IV-D). Concurrently
to our work [13] proposed a combination of the forward and
inverted index approach. Keyword search in the public-key
setting (PEKS) was introduced by [2] and later improved in
several directions [4].
B. Our Contribution
In this revised and extended version of [10], we aim to
build SSE that is optimized for the above scenarios and
provably fulfils the strongest security requirements towards
SSE schemes. While [10] presented a specific instance of
such an SSE scheme (without a formal proof of security), we
generalize the approach introduced in that work and propose
a construction that is built from an arbitrary IND-CPA
secure symmetric-key cipher and an EU-CMA secure MAC
function working over asymmetric (Type-3) bilinear groups
in which the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH)
assumption holds. Our modular approach allows for flexible
choices of the underlying primitives helping the adoption of
our scheme to concrete applications.
In order to address the above-described challenges, we
return to the forward index method to design an SSE scheme
that handles newly encrypted data without requiring any
updates on the already stored DB. The additional benefit
of this approach is that it allows periodical signing of the
encrypted DB (that can be particularly useful in case of log
files) ensuring that the DB was not modified, while the same
is impossible in dynamically changing inverted indices. The
core of our constriction is a keyword encryption and trapdoor
generation method, both with randomized outputs that allows
equality-test to determine whether a given trapdoor-ciphertext
pair corresponds to the same keyword or not. These special
keyword encryptions can then be attached to the ordinary
encryption of a document (or file) and stored together on an
honest but curious server. The security of our scheme against
adaptive chosen-keyword attacks (IND-CKA2) is proven in
the standard model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we summarize the necessary background, while in section III
the formal definition of the algorithms and security of SSE
is given. Section IV is dedicated to the proposed scheme,
its security analysis and comparisons with related concepts.
Finally we conclude our findings in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
First of all, we briefly introduce the underlying tools of our
construction, namely bilinear maps and message authentication
codes (MACs), and discuss our hardness assumption. How-
ever, we are going to make use of symmetric-key encryption
(SE) in our construction, we omit further details as for our
purposes the basic syntax suffices (we denote the encryption
and decryption algorithms by SE.Enc and SE.Dec respectively
and the used secret key by skSE). For more details on SE and
the IND-CPA security notion, we refer to standard textbooks
on cryptography.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Let G1, G2 and GT be three multiplicative cyclic groups
of prime order p. Let g1 and g2 be the generators of G1 and
G2 respectively. Let e : G1 × G2 → GT be a bilinear map
(pairing), with the following properties:
1) Bilinearity: ∀u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
2) Non-degeneracy: e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
We say that G = {p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e} is a bilinear
instance if all the group operations and the bilinear map e
are efficiently computable. In this work, we apply the so-
called “Type-3” pairings, meaning that G1 6= G2 and no
efficiently computable isomorphism exists between them. We
note that based on both its efficiency and security, this pairing
type is considered to be the ideal choice when instantiating a
cryptosystem [6].
The security of our SSE scheme can be reduced to the
hardness of the so-called Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman
(SXDH) problem that we define next. Informally speaking,
given (ga, gb, gc), where g is a generator of group G and
a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem
is to decide whether c = ab or not. The SXDH assumption
states that no efficient algorithm can solve the DDH problem
either in G1 or in G2 of a bilinear instance.
Assumption 1 (SXDH). Let gi ∈ Gi be a generator element
of the group and ai, bi ∈ Z∗p are uniformly random values for
i = 1, 2. We say that the SXDH assumption holds in a bilinear








for i = 1, 2, no polynomial time algorithm can decide whether
Ri = aibi or Ri is also a uniformly random value from Z∗p.
B. Message Authentication Codes
In our construction, we are going to make use of determin-
istic Message Authentication Codes (MAC) with a specific
syntax to construct randomized MAC for our purposes.
Definition 1. A deterministic (randomized) MAC consists of
the following algorithms:
MAC.KeyGen(λ)→ skMAC This randomized algorithm gen-
erates secret key skMAC based on security parameter λ.
MAC(skMAC,m)→ τ Using the secret key skMAC, this deter-
ministic (randomized) algorithm produces a tag τ for the
input message m.
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MAC.Verify(skMAC,m, τ)→ {0, 1} With the help of the
secret key skMAC this deterministic algorithm checks
whether τ was prepared using m or not.
Note that in case of deterministic MACs,
MAC.Verify(skMAC,m, τ) simply computes
MAC(skMAC,m) = τ ′ and checks whether τ ′ = τ or
not.
In this work, we are interested in MACs in special form i.e.,
we assume that tag τ = αF (skMAC,m), where α is a generator
element of either group G1 or G2 of the pairing group G
and F is some function of the secret key and the message
to be authenticated. In the literature, several Pseudo-Random
Functions (PRF) were described [16], [14], [3], [1] in the
desired form under various hardness assumptions. However,
for our purposes this stronger guarantee of pseudo-randomness
is not required, any of these can serve as proper MAC
functions satisfying the following requirement of existential
unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EU-CMA).
Definition 2 (EU-CMA). We say that a MAC function
(MAC.KeyGen, MAC, MAC.Verify) is secure if it is existen-
tially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EU-CMA)
i.e., let λ ∈ N be a security parameter, and A =
(A1, . . . ,Aq+1) be an non-uniform adversary that has at most
negligible advantage in the EU-CMAMAC,A(λ) experiment
(depicted on Figure 1):
Pr(EU-CMAMAC,A(λ) = 1) ≤ negl(λ).
EU-CMAMAC,A(λ) Security Game
skMAC ←$ MAC.KeyGen(1λ)
{m1, stateA1} ← A1(1
λ)
(τ1,m1)← MAC(skMAC,m1)
for i = 2, . . . , q
{mi, stateAi} ← Ai
(





1λ, stateAq , {(τi,mi)}i∈[q]
)
if MAC.Verify(skMAC, m̄, τ̄) = 1 and m̄ /∈ {m1, . . . ,mq}
return 1
Figure 1. EU-CMA security game.
For instance, the construction of [16] can be used assuming
the hardness of the DDH problem that is implied by the SXDH
assumption used in this work.
III. SEARCHABLE SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
The focus of this work is SSE, more precisely using the
terminology of [4] we are interested in the single writer/single
reader setting. In an abstract version of the scenarios, described
in the Introduction, the data owner generates the system pa-
rameters, secret keys, encrypts data and prepares the trapdoors
using the secret keys. Besides storing the ciphertexts, the
server is able to search over encrypted data using trapdoors
for specific keywords, issued by the data owner. The server is
assumed to be semi-trusted (honest-but-curious) and the com-
munication channel between the user and the server supposed
to be authenticated. Next, we define the algorithms and the
security of an SSE scheme that fits into this abstract scenario.
A. Definition of SSE
An SSE scheme consists of the following algorithms.
SSE.Setup(λ)→ (P, sk) Upon receiving a security parame-
ter λ it outputs the system parameters P and a secret key
sk.
SSE.Enc(P, sk,m,w) → (C) Using the secret key sk it
computes ciphertext C that encrypts m under keyword
w.
SSE.TrpdGen(P, sk, ŵ) → (T ) Using the secret key sk it
computes a trapdoor T that can be used to test whether
some ciphertext C was encrypted under keyword ŵ or
not.
SSE.Dec(P, sk, C) → (m) It decrypts ciphertext C with
secret-key sk and outputs the resulting plaintext m.
SSE.Test(P, T, C) → {0, 1} The equality testing algorithm
outputs 1 if T and C encodes the same keyword i.e.,
w = ŵ and 0 otherwise.
B. Security Model for SSE
The commonly used security model for SSE was defined
by [7] to capture the intuition that, in the course of using the
scheme, the remotely stored files and search queries together
do not leak more information about the underlying data than
the search pattern and the search outcome. In our security
definition, we follow [7] but we formulate it – to the best of
our knowledge for the first time – in the context of a forward
index.
While in the inverted index-based approach the index and
the ciphertexts are handled separately, in our case of a forward
index, it is natural to view the “index” as part of the ciphertext.
We formulate the model in this way, defining indistinguisha-
bility under adaptive chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA2)
through a game between a challenger and an adversary. In
the game, the adversary has to recognize which one of two
challenge datasets (consisting of messages and their keywords
chosen by herself) was encrypted by the challenger. While we
are interested in a setting where the database is not static but
can be expanded dynamically, in the security model we still
restrict the adversary to query encryptions once and query only
trapdoors adaptively. The reason behind this is that (in both
of our motivating scenarios) searchability in a subset of the
DB can be enforced by choosing time-dependent keywords
(i.e., “error-01-01-2018” instead of “error”). With the natural
assumption that searches only apply to time periods that are
already over (and thus updates does not affect them) without
loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to one specific
– now static – subset of the DB (i.e., data from a given time
frame). Note that in a forward index even the knowledge of
the order of ciphertexts can help the attacker, that is why
our challenger provides her with a random permutation of
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ciphertexts prepared from the randomly chosen challenge mes-
sage set. The adversary has access not only to the encryptions
themselves but also to a trapdoor generation oracle that can
be queried adaptively with pairs of keywords corresponding to
the two challenge sets. The oracle answers consistently with
a trapdoor for that keyword which belongs to the encrypted
challenge data set. The only restriction is that the queried
keywords cannot separate the two challenge sets, as we are
interested in information leakage beyond the search result.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that there is a single
keyword for each message, but this can be easily generalized.
More formally we use the subsequent definition of security
following [7, §4.2.2].
Definition 3 (Adaptive indistinguishably). Let SSE = (Setup,
Enc, TrpdGen, Dec, Test) be a secret-key searchable en-
cryption scheme, λ ∈ N a security parameter, and A =
(A0, . . . ,Aq+1) a non-uniform adversary. Consider the proba-
bilistic experiment Ind-CKA2SSE,A(λ) depicted on Figure
2 with the restriction that the number of keyword matches
between the challenge message sets and the corresponding
test-key queries are equal i.e.,
#{i|ŵ0j = w0i for j ∈ [k]} = #{i|ŵ1j = w1i for j ∈ [k]}
for all k = 1, . . . , q, where q is some polynomial of the security






parse Db as {(mb1, wb1), . . . , (mbn, wbn)}
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
Cbi ←$ SSE.Enc(sk,mbi , wbi ),
Cb := (Cbπ1 , . . . , C
b
πn) for a random permutation π,





j )← Aj(stateAj−1 , C
b, {T bi }i∈[j])
T bj ←$ SSE.TrpdGen(sk, ŵbj)
b′ ← Aq+1(stateAq , C
b, {Tj}i=1,...,q)
return b = b′
Figure 2. IND-CKA2 security game for forward index SSE schemes.
sense of adaptive indistinguishability if for all polynomial-time
adversaries A = (A0, . . . ,Aq+1),





In this part, we first describe a randomized MAC function
based on any deterministic one in the form described in
subsection II-B and then utilize the resulting MAC to build
our new SSE algorithms. We analyse both the security and
the performance of the proposed scheme in subsection IV-C
and IV-D respectively.
A. Randomized MAC for SSE
In our SSE construction, we are going to make crucial use
of two properties of the used MAC function. First, it needs
to work over a bilinear pairing group i.e., depending on its
input, it should prepare the output tag in one of the groups G1,
G2. It also needs to be randomized meaning that a verification
algorithm needs to be explicitly defined, as preparing the MAC
of the same message two times results in different tags. We
propose a simple solution, denoted by MAC’, fulfilling these
requirements, based on any deterministic MAC described in
subsection II-B.
MAC.KeyGen’(λ,G)→ skMAC It is identical to the original
MAC.KeyGen(λ).
MAC’(gi, skMAC,m)→ τ On input gi, which is a generator
element of group Gi, the output is prepared in this group.
In order to do so, the algorithm first samples a random
r ∈ Z∗p and sets α = gri . Then using α, it computes
MAC(skMAC,m) = αF (skMAC,m) := τ ′. The output is the
two-tuple τ = (α, τ ′).
MAC.Verify’(skMAC,m, τ)→ {0, 1} It takes α from τ and
checks if αF (skMAC,m) = τ ′. If so it outputs 1, otherwise
0.
The EU-CMA security of the this randomized MAC fol-
lows from the security of the underlying deterministic MAC.
B. SSE Construction
The intuition behind the construction of our Test algorithm
is fairly simple. We build the trapdoors for a specific keyword
and the keyword related ciphertext components in a symmet-
ric manner: both are randomised MACs of the underlying
keyword, however, represented in distinct groups G1 or G2.
This enables us to test equality by “mixing” the ciphertext
and the trapdoor in two different ways (using the pairing
operation) that are equal only if the underlying keywords are
the same. Using distinct groups prevents the testability both
among ciphertexts and among trapdoors. In more detail, the
algorithms are the following.
SSE.Setup(λ)→ (P, sk) It proceeds with the following steps:
• samples an instance of Type-3, asymmetric bilinear
pairing groups, G = {p,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e},
• chooses an instance of the above defined MAC’ that
implicitly defines function F : Z∗p × Z∗p → Z∗p,
• runs the MAC.KeyGen’ algorithm of the chosen
MAC function to generate skMAC,
• samples secret keys skSE for the used SE scheme,
• samples secret key skSSE←$Z∗p,
• outputs the public parameters P = (G, F, gskSSE) and
the secret key sk = {skMAC, skSE, skSSE}.
SSE.Enc(P, sk,m,w)→ (C) The encryption of data m is
executed using the encryption algorithm of a symmetric-
key cipher while for the encryption of the keyword we
utilize first MAC’:
• it runs MAC’(g1, skMAC, w) = (α = gr1, τ ′ =
g
rF (skMAC,w)
1 ) where r ∈ Z∗p is sampled randomly,
• finally it computes the following ciphertext:
C =
(
c1 = α, c2 = τ
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SSE.TrpdGen(P, sk, ŵ)→ (T ) Upon receiving a keyword ŵ






2 ) where r
′ ∈ Z∗p is sampled randomly,








SSE.Dec(sk, C)→ (m) After parsing C as (c1, c2, c3), in
order to recover the encrypted data the decryption
algorithm of the symmetric-key scheme is used and
SE.Dec(skSE, c3) = m is returned, while the rest of the
ciphertext is not affected.
SSE.Test(P, T, C)→ {0, 1} To test whether a ciphertext C
(parsed as (c1, c2, c3)) was encoded using the same
keyword that is hidden in trapdoor T (parsed as (t1, t2))
the following equality is checked:
e(c2, t1) = e(c1, t2).
If the equality holds the output is 1, otherwise 0.
The correctness of the SSE.Dec and SSE.Test algo-
rithms follows after substitution of the proper values into
the formulas i.e., in case of the latter one e(c2, t1) =
e(g1, g2)
rr′skSSEF (skMAC,w) = e(g1, g2)
rr′skSSEF (skMAC,ŵ) =
e(c1, t2) iff w = ŵ.
C. Security Analysis
In this part, we formulate our main theorem and its proof.
Theorem IV.1. If the used symmetric-key encryption scheme
is IND-CPA secure, the underlying MAC function is
EU-CMA secure and the SXDH assumption holds in
the pairing group G, then the proposed SSE scheme is
IND-CKA2 secure according to Definition 3.
Before proving the theorem, we prove three lemmas that
are going to be used in the proof of the theorem.
Lemma IV.2. The SSE ciphertext C = (c1, c2, c3) alone
(when no trapdoor is issued) is semantically (IND-CPA)
secure, if the underlying SE scheme is IND-CPA secure and
the SXDH assumption holds.
Proof sketch. By our assumption, the ciphertext of the
symmetric-key cipher is semantically secure and thus in order
to prove the lemma we have to show that the other two
components c1, c2 of the SSE ciphertext is also indistin-
guishable from truly random values (when trapdoors do not
help to distinguish them). Note that the structure of these
values is reminiscent of ElGamal ciphertexts. The difference
is that the “message” F (skMAC, w) is not multiplied by the
randomizing factor grskSSEi but exponentiated to it, however, the
same reduction of the DDH assumption in G1 to the security
of the scheme works here just like in case of the ElGamal
cryptosystem. In the reduction the simulator answers for
queries for keywords wj (for some j, smaller than the allowed
number queries) with c1 = g
rj
1 , c2 = g
rjb1F (skMAC,wj)
1 , while
in the challenge phase sends c1 = ga11 , c2 = g
R·F (skMAC,wb)
1
for randomly chosen b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally the output of the
simulator is 1 if the guess b′ of the adversary is b = b′ and 0
otherwise.
Lemma IV.3. As long as the SXDH assumption holds and
testing equality with ciphertexts does not help distinguishing
the SSE trapdoor T = (t1, t2) from a truly random tuple, T
hides the underlying keyword with IND-CPA security.
Proof sketch. Note that, just like c1, c2 from C, the structure
of T also resembles the ElGamal ciphertext and thus the proof
of the lemma again follows the blueprint of reducing the
security of the ElGamal cryptosystem to the DDH assumption
(i.e., in our case, to the SXDH assumption in group G2).
Lemma IV.4. The SSE trapdoor T = (t1, t2) is existentially-
unforgeable (EU-CMA secure).
Proof. We are going to show that if there exists an efficient
algorithm A that can forge trapdoor T = (t1, t2), then there
also exist B that using A can forge the underlying MAC’
function, contradicting with its EU-CMA security.
According to Definition 2, B has access to a CMA oracle
which replies with τ = (α, τ ′) for a message request w.
This allows B to answer the trapdoor requests of A for
any keyword w with a valid trapdoor T = (t1 = α =
gr
′
2 , t2 = τ
′skSSE = g
r′skSSEF (skMAC,w)
2 ), after generating an SSE









for keyword w̄, that was
not requested previously, B can compute τ̄ = (ᾱ = t1, τ̄ ′ =
t̄2)
1/skSSE and output the pair (τ̄ ′, w̄) as the forged message-tag
pair, breaking the security of the underlying MAC’.
Now we are ready to prove our main theorem.
Proof of Theorem IV.1. We are going to define several hybrid
games where in the last hybrid the attacker receives encryp-
tions of random values under random keywords instead of
the challenge message and trapdoors for random keywords
instead of the queried ones, thus she cannot have a non-
negligible advantage in that game. In order to prove the
theorem, we systematically show that the subsequent hybrids
are indistinguishable for the adversary and thus her advantage
in the original game is essentially negligible as well.
For the ease of exposition we introduce some notations.
Let ~W = (W1, . . . ,Wm) be the vector of all queried keyword
values either for a trapdoor or as part of the encryption query
(thus m ≤ n + q). We denote the set of message (keyword)
query indices that match with Wj by IWj = {i|wbi = Wj}
(and by ÎWj = {i|ŵbi = Wj} respectively). Let R be
an initially empty list of two-tuples (Wi, Ri) in which the
challenger can store random Ri values for each Wi. Finally
we denote the components of Cbi by c1,i, c2,i, c3,i and the
components of T bi by t1,i, t2,i. We define the following hybrid
games.
Hyb0: it corresponds to the original game.
Hyb1: the same as Hyb0 but in Cb, the third ciphertext
components c3,i are substituted with random values of
the ciphertext space for all i ∈ [n].
Hyb2,1: the same as Hyb1, with the following exception. A
random R1←$Z∗p is sampled and (W1, R1) is appended
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to R. For each i ∈ IW1 and the challenger answers with
Cbi in which the second parameter is c2,i = g
riR1
1 instead




1 . Similarly for each i ∈ ÎW1
the challenger answers to trapdoor queries for ŵbi with T
b
i
in which t2,i = g
r′iR1






Hyb2,m: the same as Hyb2,m−1, with the following exception.
A random Rm←$Z∗p is sampled and (Wm, Rm) is ap-
pended to R. For each i ∈ IWm the challenger answers
with Cbi in which the second parameter is c2,i = g
riRm
1




1 . Similarly for each
i ∈ ÎWm the challenger answers to trapdoor queries
for ŵbi with T
b








Now we are going to show that the subsequent hybrids are
indistinguishable for the attacker.
Claim IV.5. The computational indistinguishability of Hyb0
and Hyb1 follows from Lemmas IV.2 and IV.3.
Lemma IV.2 states that c3,i is semantically secure or in
other words that the adversary can have at most negligible
advantage in distinguishing it from a random value. At the
same time, keywords are possibly not independent of the data
and thus the other ciphertext components c1,i, c2,i can help
Ato recognize the shift between the hybrids. However, even
if wi = f(mi) for some function f , the testing algorithm
cannot help A because the results of it are identical in the
two hybrids. The only remaining possibility is that c1,i, c2,i
leaks information about wi (and thus indirectly about mi) but
this would contradict with Lemma IV.3.
Consequently, A can have at most 2n+ q times negligible
advantage in distinguishing Hyb0 and Hyb1, that is still
negligible.
Claim IV.6. Hyb1 and Hyb2,1 are computationally indistin-
guishable because of Lemmas IV.2, IV.3 and IV.4.
First of all, we notice that the SSE.Test algorithm does not
help the adversary in distinguishing these hybrids as it clearly
has the same outputs in both cases. Also note that semantic
security of the ciphertexts and the trapdoors (guaranteed by
Lemmas IV.2, IV.3) are necessary but not sufficient to imply
indistinguishability. The reason is that in Hyb1, A might be
able to use the trapdoor queries to gather valid keyword-
trapdoor pairs adaptively in order to generate a valid trapdoor
Tq+1 for keyword ŵq+1 that was not queried in the game,
thus it might not fulfil the constraints of the game1. However,
according to Lemma IV.4, the trapdoors are EU-CMA secure
meaning that A can have only negligible advantage even in
Hyb1 to generate a non-queried keyword-trapdoor pair just
like in Hyb2,1 in which the trapdoor is independent of the
actual keyword. This shows that the attacker can have at most
(|IW1 + ÎW1 |+1) times negligible advantage in distinguishing
Hyb1 and Hyb2,1.
1We note that in case of Claim IV.5 the same was not a problem, as the
extra knowledge of another valid message-ciphertext pair would not help the
attacker in the game.
Note that the indistinguishability of the remaining hybrids
follows from an analogous argument (as we repeat the same
steps in those cases) showing that the following claim holds
as well.
Claim IV.7. The computational indistinguishability of
Hyb2,i−1 and Hyb2,i for any i ∈ [2,m] follows from Lemmas
IV.2, IV.3 and IV.4.
By showing the indistinguishability of the hybrids we have
proven the theorem.
Forward privacy guarantees that trapdoors can only be used
to test keywords of documents which were already part of the
DB at the time of issuing the trapdoor. We remark that by
default, our scheme is not forward secure (trapdoors can be
stored by the server and can be used to test future ciphertexts)
but the already mentioned usage of time-dependent keywords
can remedy this deficiency, thus achieving forward (and also
backward) privacy between the time periods. Note that the
same solution of time-specific keywords would result in an
infinitely growing inverted index.
D. Evaluation and Comparisons
We compare our results with dynamic SSE schemes which
are the most suitable in the literature for the use cases that
we considered in this work. Table I shows a comparison using
the following notations: n denotes the number of documents
(data entries), wD is the number of keywords per a specific
document, W is the total number of distinct keywords in the
DB, nw is the number of documents matching the searched
keyword w, a is the total number of additions to the DB and d
is the total number of deletions, b is the bit length of encrypted
documents. ∗ indicates that update requires some rounds of
interaction between the server and the client and ∗∗ denotes
amortized complexity.
As predicted in the introduction, Table I confirms that our
search strategy of sequential scan is not competitive, unless
only a small portion of the DB (e.g., at most (logW )/wD ci-
phertexts) is enough to scan, that is realistic in the investigated
scenarios. The most important benefits of our scheme include
resistance against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks in the
standard model and non-interactive update of ciphertexts with
low complexity, depending only on the number of keywords.
Moreover, our ciphertexts (including the index) and trapdoors
are very short, consisting of wD + 2 and 2 group elements
respectively.
Let us emphasize that updating the DB with a new record
is straightforward in our approach. The client encrypts the
data together with the keywords and the server only has to
store the received ciphertexts contrary to other solutions where
the server has to “find the place” of the new entry in the
index. This latter process also harms the privacy of updates in
most cases by leaking information about the added keywords
(e.g., all documents with common keywords can be identified).
In our case, only the number of added keywords is leaked,
however, in the targeted applications it is plausible to assume
that the number of keywords is not varying among the different
“documents”.
 
M. HORVATH et al.: SEARCHABLE SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION FOR RESTRICTED SEARCH  109
Table I
COMPARISON OF OUR RESULTS AND DYNAMIC SSE SCHEMES. (FOR NOTATIONS AND EVALUATION SEE SUBSECTION IV-D.)
Scheme Model Security Fw/Bw Privacy Update Complexity Update Privacy Search Complexity
[17] Standard IND-CPA × / × O(b) × O(n · b)
[15] Standard IND-CKA2 × / × O(wD)∗ × O(logW )
[12] ROM CKA2 × / × O(wD) × O(nw)
[11] ROM CKA2 × / × O(logn)∗ X O(nw logn)
[5] ROM CKA2 × / × O(wD + W logn) × O(nw + a + d)
[18] ROM CKA2 X / × O(wD log(nW ))∗ X O(nw + d)
[9] ROM CKA2 × / × O(nwD/D)∗∗ × O(nwD/D)∗∗
[22] ROM CKA2 X / X O(W ) X O(W )
[8] Standard IND-CKA2 × / × O(wD ·W ) × O(logn)
[13] ROM CKA2 X / × O(wD)∗ X O(nw)∗
Our scheme Standard IND-CKA2 X / X O(wD) X O(n · wD)
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we revisited the role of sequential scan in search-
able encryption and showed a construction that outperforms
the existing solutions in real-life scenarios when not the entire
database is scanned. Our scheme was proven IND-CKA2
secure in the standard model assuming the widely used SXDH
holds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme
with a forward index that is proven secure in this strong model.
Our modular design allows flexible choices of the underlying
primitives in a future implementation.
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